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THE CONSTITUTION AND JOB DISCRIMINATION
VERN COUNTRYMAN*

"In almost every way that unemployment is measured and charted
Negroes are among those who suffer the heaviest."' In 1962, one out
of twenty whites were unemployed compared to one out of nine nonwhites (90 per cent of whom are Negroes). In the past five years the
nonwhite unemployment rate has never been less than double the
white rate. In every occupational group, from the common laborer
to the highly trained professional, the nonwhite unemployment rate
exceeds the white. That rate among nonwhite teenagers is "dangerously
high:" 21% of all teenage boys and 28% of all teenage girls.' Given
these grim statistics, it is not surprising that last August's march on
Washington was for "jobs and freedom."
In part, of course, this situation is due to the fact that a higher
proportion of nonwhites than whites are not trained for skilled or even
semi-skilled employment. To that extent, the problem is a product of
years of discrimination in other areas.' Some effort to meet this aspect
of the matter is now being made through a variety of federal employment training and retraining programs. Negroes are participating in
these federal programs in about the same proportion as they populate
the ranks of the unemployed, although in some southern states they
must attend segregated classes to do so. But seven out of ten Negroes
hired through these programs are hired as common laborers.' Obviously, the results of a century of discrimination will not be eliminated
overnight.
Apart from the question of employment qualifications, however, it
is apparent that employment opportunities for Negroes and other
minority groups are restricted also by discriminatory hiring and
tenure practices. "The old adage that the Negroes are the last hired
and the first fired" is still substantially accurate.' It is with this aspect
of the problem that I am concerned.
* Dean and Professor Law, University of New Mexico, Visiting Professor Harvard
University (1963-1964).
1 Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 73 (1963).
2 Id. at 731.
3 If further evidence is needed that there is no "natural " inferiority, we have it in
the recently published report of a Committee of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science. Boston Globe, November 3, 1963, 35.
4 Supra note 1 at 74.
5Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Vol. 3, p. 1 (1961).
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I should perhaps state the assumptions from which my discussion
proceeds. I view discrimination on the basis of race, color, national
origin or creed as an intolerable practice and a mockery of our national
aspirations whether it occurs in the field of employment or elsewhere.
The continuation of such practices more than 100 years after the
Emanicipation Proclamation seems to me a national disgrace whose
elimination cannot longer await the general enlightenment of all parts
of the nation. The full powers of government should be brought to
bear against such discriminatory practices. And in my search for the
most effective use to be made of governmental powers to that end the
individual rights involved seem to me heavily to outweigh any argument for continued obeisance to "states rights"--particularly as the
argument emanates from states dedicated to the denial of individual
rights on grounds of race.
Neither do I proceed from the notion that the judiciary, unlike the
other two branches of government, should exercise some extraordinary
sort of self restraint in the discharge of its governmental functions.6
Our courts have a law-making function which should be performed as
conscientiously, but no more timidly, than the law-making function of
other branches. It seems to me only remarkable, in a common law
society which has also charged its courts to implement such sweeping
constitutional mandates as due process clauses, that anyone should
think otherwise.7
Finally, I find no help in, because I cannot understand, the recent
plea for the application of "neutral principles" in constitutional adjudication.8 The content of this neutrality concept remains intensely
undefined,' but it seems to mean, as Judge Charles E. Clark has said,
"that the principled decision is one which follows the beaten track
rather closely, while a decision without precedent, breaking new
ground, must be unprincipled,"' so that not only Brown v. Board of
Educ.," but also Gibbons v. Ogden'2 and McCulloch v. Maryland3
6

See MENDELsoN, JUsTicEs BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CoNFLICT IN THE COURT

(1961).

7 See Clark, T7ze Limits of Judicial Objectivity, 12 Am. U. L. Ray. 1 (1963) ; Clark
& Trubek, he Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common
Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255 (1961); Kalven, Book Review, 37 IND. LJ. 572
(1962) ; Alfange, Book Review, 72 YALE L.J. 1042 (1962).
8 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HAxv. L. Ray. 1

(1959).
9 See Mueller & Schwartz, The Principle of Neutral Principles, 7 U.C.L.A. L.

REV. 571 (1960) ; Miller & Howell, 77te Myth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. Ray. 661 (1960).
10 Clark, A Plea for the Unprincipled Decision, 49 VA. L. REv. 660, 664 (1960).
124 Wheat. 315 (1819).
129 Wheat. 1 (1824).
11347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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were not properly, neutrally principled. If this be the test for the
principled decision, I agree with Judge Clark that we need more
unprincipled ones.
With this disclosure of my own biases, I proceed to an examination
of what has been done, and to an exploration of what can be done, to
eliminate discriminatory employment practices.
PRESENT POLICIES

Very little has yet been done in this area by the Congress or the
President. Discrimination in the classified civil service on the basis of
"sex, marital status, race, creed or color" is forbidden by statute.'
President Kennedy's Executive Order of March 6, 1961,15 declares a
policy against employment discrimination on grounds of race, creed,
color or national origin anywhere in the executive branch and creates a
President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity to supervise adherence to this policy. In addition, the Committee is empowered
to enforce the same policy on all work performed under government
contracts and, under an amendment of June 22, 1963,16 on all construction contracts undertaken pursuant to any federal program involving
governmental grants, loans, insurance or guarantees. Contractors who
fail to comply with the policy may have their contracts terminated
and may be declared ineligible for future contracts. But the Executive
Orders do not reach to the vast federal programs of grants-in-aid to
states and localities, which accounted for $7.5 billion in Federal expenditures in 196 1,17 and the various federal agencies which administer
these programs pursue no consistent policy against discriminatory
employment practices.
More has been done in some twenty states and numerous cities
where, following the New York example of 1945, statutes or ordinances
forbid discrimination in employment and elsewhere and establish
administrative agencies with procedures similar to those of the National
Labor Relations Board to enforce the legislative policy. A careful
study of the operations of such agencies made three years ago demonstrates that the most effective of them are those which have enforcement as well as conciliation powers and that, particularly in dealing
with discriminatory empolyment practices, the agency needs the
145 U.S.C. Sec. 1074.
15 Executive Order 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
16Executive Order 11114, 28 Fed. Reg. 6485 (1963).
regulations are published in 28 Fed. Reg. 9812 (1963).
1T Supra note 5 at 81.
18 Id., 84-91.

The Committee's revised
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authority to act on its own initiative and to invoke some sort of interlocutory relief while cases are being processed. 9
There can no longer be serious doubts about the constitutionality
of such state and local legislative efforts. When New York forbade
labor unions to discriminate in their membership policies or to discriminate against members on grounds of race, color or creed, an objecting
union which sought to enshrine its Freedom to discriminate in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment was told that its argument had "no constitutional basis."" And if the due process clause
does not protect the employer's right to discriminate in hiring and
firing on a ground so near to his pocketbook as union membership, 2
it is unlikley that it will be found to protect his right to discriminate
on a ground so dear to his prejudices as race or color.
Decisions invalidating state laws which required2 2 or forbade"
segregation within the state of passengers on interstate carriers might
have suggested that the commerce clause imposed some limitations on
the states' power to prohibit discrimination in employment. But
doubts on this score seem to be disposed of by last term's decision finding that Colorado could forbid racial discrimination by an interstate
airline in the hiring of its pilots, since the "hiring within a State of an
employee, even for an interstate job, [is] a much more localized matter than the transporting of passengers from State to State." Moreover, insofar as the passenger cases found the burden on commerce
in the possibility of conflicting regulation, recent cases dealing with
segregation in education 2 as well as segregation of passengers in
interstate and intrastate transportation2 5 were taken to establish that
fany state or federal law requiring applicants for any job to be turned
away because of their color would be invalid under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process and Equal Pro26
tection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
10

The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement of Antidiscrim-

ination Legislation, 74 HAuv. L. REv. 526 (1961).

20 Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 94 (1945).
21 Associated Press v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 103 (1937) ; N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laugh-

lin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1936); Texas and NO.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. &
Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
22 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
23
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877). Cf. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan
333 U.S. 28 (1948).
2-4
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Boiling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
25 Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962).
20 Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S.
714 (1963)
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The chief shortcoming of the states as a source of protection against
discrimination in employment, then, does not lie in their want of
power to act. It lies, rather, in the unwillingness of some of them to do
so. It is apparent that relief will not come from those states where it
is most needed.
The solution to the problem, if it is to come in our life-time, must
come from an exercise of national powers. I turn, therefore, to an
examination of what the federal constitution requires and what it
authorizes Congress to require.
CONSTITUTIONAL

REQUIREMENTS

We may begin where most of the litigation involving racial discrimination has begun, with the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment. Here, the beginnings go back at least
to the Civil Rights Cases" construing these clauses as a limitation on
state action only, so that the authority conferred upon Congress by the
fourteenth amendment to enforce its provisions by "appropriate legislation" could not extend to a federal statute forbidding "simply a private wrong" consisting of the refusal of a carrier, an inn-keeper or a
theater operator to serve Negroes. Nothing was decided in those cases
about the power of Congress under the commerce clause, and that
power has been successfully employed to forbid racial discrimination
in service by interstate carriers28 and by the operators of restaurants
in the terminals of such carriers.29 But the Civil Rights Cases stand
for two substantial limitations on federal powers under the fourteenth
amendment: (1) Congress may legislate only against state action
denying due process of law or the equal protection of the laws; it may
not act to "provide due process of law" or to "establish laws for...
equal protection." (2) Although the fourteenth amendment is to be
enforced by the courts as well as the Congress, it can be invoked by
the courts also only as against "state action."
But the Court in the Civil Rights Cases was clear that the fourteenth amendment would reach to "all state legislation, and state
action of every kind," and the subsequent history of racial discrimination cases under that amendment has been largely devoted to identifying action to be characterized as state action. The full reach of this
constitutional limitation upon action which is governmental rather than
27 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
See also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882)
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
28 Henderson v. United States, 340 U.S. 846 (1950).
29 Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
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private is not to be found solely in cases dealing with the states and the
fourteenth amendment, however. Instructive analogies are to be found
in the cases under the fifteenth amendment, which forbids both the
states and the United States to deny or abridge any citizen's rights to
vote on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude. And
further analogies are to be found under the due process clause of the
fifth amendment, which forbids racial discrimination by the federal
government, not only in its governance of the District of Columbia, 0
but also in its regulation of interstate commerce 3 and-as the fourth
circuit has recently reminded us32 in invalidating the segregation allowed by the "separate but equal" facilities clause in the Hill-Burton
Act 3 for private hospitals constructed with federal aid-in its expenditure of federal funds.
The Texas Democratic primary cases began the exploration of the
"state action" concept. Moving from the easy conclusion that a state
statute excluding Negroes from a party primary violated the fourteenth amendment,34 the Supreme Court found the vice not cured by
repeal of that statute and the adoption of another which gave the
authority to discriminate to the State Executive Committee of the
party, whose members were found to act "as the delegates of the
state."3 5 After an original decision to the contrary,"6 the same conclusion was reached where the discrimination was practiced by the
party convention and where the state by statute provided for the primary election in such a fashion that it could be said that the party
convention acted as "an agency of the State.""7
These cases may be said to establish no more than that action by
one authorized by the state to act is state action even though the actor
is given no official title. But cases decided under the old Civil Rights
Acts applicable to those who act "under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom"3 8 or "under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage,"3 " have pushed matters a bit
0 state election officials who were
further. In United States v. Classic,"
charged under the federal act with acting "under color of state law"
80 Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).

31 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville RR Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).

New York Times, November 2, 1963, 12.
3342 U.S.C. §291e(f).
34 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
35 Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 85 (1932).
36 Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
37 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944).
34 18 U.S.C. §242.
39 42 U.S.C. §1983.
32

40 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
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in their failure to count the ballots of some voters in a state primary
for the nomination of Congressional candidates got no comfort from
the fact that the state statutes required an accurate count. "Misuse of
power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is
action taken 'under color of' state law." The application of the statute
in Classic was premised upon the right to choose federal Representatives as guaranteed by article I, sec. 2, which "is secured against the
action of individuals as well as of states," so that only statutory construction and not the meaning of "state action" was involved.
But in Screws v. United States,4 where application of the same
statute to a sheriff charged with killing a prisoner was based upon the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, defendant was told
that, "Acts of officers who undertake to perform their official duties
are included whether they hew to the line of their authority or overstep it." And in Monroe v. Pape,42 where application of the federal
statute was again premised upon the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Court reaffirmed that "Congress has the power
to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who
carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity,
whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it."
In both the Texas primary cases and the Civil Rights Acts cases, it
might be said that, since the state had selected the particular organization or individual to perform the particular task out of which
complaint arose, nothing more than a liberal application of respondeat
superior was involved. But a considerably broader application of
agency notions is involved in the labor union cases. Although thus far
confiined to racial discrimination only as manifested in the negotiation
of collective bargaining contracts4" and the processing of grievances44
by unions selected by a majority of employees and given exclusive
representation authority by the Railway Labor Act or the Labor
Management Relations Act, the potentialities are large. The fifth
amendment's requirements are to be read into the federal statutes
41325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945).
42365 U.S. 167, 171-172 (1961).

See also Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97,
98 (1951), where a private detective was found to be acting "under color of law"
because he held a "special police officers card" issued by the city, "had taken an oath
and qualified as a special police officer," and was accompanied by a regular police
officer while he coerced confessions from the complaining witnesses.
43 Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 232 (1949) ; Steele v. Louisville
and Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
44 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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because the union "is clothed with power not unlike that of a legislature which is subject to constitutional limitations on its power to deny,
restrict, destroy or discriminate against the rights of those for whom
it legislates and which is also under an affirmative constitutional duty
to protect those rights." 5 Add only a contract for compulsory union
membership, executed within the Congressionally conferred authority,
and the union's use of its dues revenue may become subject to constitutional limitations. 6 By the same token, the expenditures of
integrated bar associations may be subject to fourteenth amendment
limitations.4 It is no longer clear that the act of the state's agent is
state action only if committed within the scope of his authority.
And if the state's grant of exclusive representational authority to a
labor union is sufficient to convert the action of the union into state
action, what of the state's certificate of convenience and necessity
which confers upon a public utility an exclusive monopoly to provide
goods or services? Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak48 found that
Congress, by granting a franchise to a privately owned transit company which conferred a "substantial monopoly" in the District of
Columbia, and a federal regulatory commission, by refusing to forbid
radio broadcasting in its passenger vehicles, had "sufficiently involved
the Federal Government in responsibility for the radio programs to
make the First and Fifth Amendments ...applicable." Is the fourteenth amendment any less applicable under state franchise? Bowman
v. Birmingham Transp. Co.,4" concluded that it was not, and found
the amendment violated when a transit company franchised by the
city segregated its passengers. And how different are those operating
under state-granted licenses, such as liquor licenses, which are issued
in limited numbers?
From the franchise or license which confers a complete or partial
monopoly, the pursuit of state action may turn to those who operate
enterprises under state or local license or permit issued to all who can
qualify. Here at least, it is said, matters are different. Such licenses
or permits are merely devices for collecting taxes, or implementing
safety or sanitary regulations, or imposing standards for the technical
qualifications of those operating the enterprise. 0
45 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., supra note 43 at 198.
46 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
47 See Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
48 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952).
40 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960).
GO Statement of Paul Freund, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Commerce

on S.1732, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1183, 1188 (1961) ; Karst & Van Alstyne, Sit-ins
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Perhaps the distinction is valid if the confines of state action are to
be found in doctrines of agency. But reliance upon agency doctrine has
already been marked by three important exceptions.
One exception is to found in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,"' finding discriminatory state action where a privately operated
restaurant in premises leased from a state parking authority refused to
serve Negroes. There was no indication that the state leased the
premises to a restaurant operator because a restaurant was desired in
conjunction with the parking facilities. Indeed, there was evidence
that the state would not have leased the premises at all had it not been
deemed advisable in order to insure coverage of the costs of constructing and operating the parking facilities. But the state did benefit from
the rentals received and from the parking needs of restaurant patrons
and the restaurant benefited from the convenience of parking facilities
and possibly from tax exemption. This was held enough to indicate
"that degree of state participation and involvement in discriminatory
action which it was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to condemn....

The State has so far insinuated itself into a position of

interdependence with [the restaurant operator] that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on
that account, cannot be considered to have been so 'purely private' as
to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment." It is difficult
to imagine how any governmental leasing of property could be viewed
as significantly different, and analogies can be drawn to other forms of
governmental economic aid such as subsidies and special tax advantages. And, as previously indicated,52 the fourth circuit has found
both the federal and state governments under the federal grants-in-aid
program for hospital construction "so involved in the conduct of these
otherwise private bodies that their activities are also the activities of
these governments."
Perhaps Burton merely adds the concept of joint venture to the
orthodox doctrines of agency. The same cannot be said for the remaining two exceptions.
Marsh v. Alabama53 cuts across both of them. Invalidating under
the first and fourteenth amendments the application of a state trespass
statute to those who distributed religious literature in a companyand State Action--Mr. Justice Douglas Concurring, 14 STAN. L. Raw. 762, 774-775

(1962) ; Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959).
51365 U.S. 715, 724-725 (1961).
52 Supra note 32.
53326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
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owned town in violation of company rules, the Court rejected the
argument that "the corporation's right to control the inhabitants of
[the town] is coextensive with the right of the homeowner to regulate
the conduct of his guests."
Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an
owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public
in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.... Thus the owners
of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes and railroads may not
operate them as freely as a farmer does his farm. Since these facilities
are built and operated primarily to benefit the public and since their
operation is essentially a public function, it is subject to state
regulation....
The managers appointed by the corporation cannot curtail the
liberty of press and religion of these people consistently with the purposes of the Constitutional guarantees, and a state statute, as the one
here involved, which enforces such action by criminally punishing
those who attempt to distribute religious literature clearly violates the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution."
Here are two distinct ideas: (1) Property devoted to public use
may be regulated to protect individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution against state action. (2) The invocation of state sanctions
to vindicate private discrimination constitutes state action in violation
of those guarantees.
The second idea, of course, was pursued in cases finding a violation
of the fourteenth amendment where state courts are employed specifically to enforce55 or to grant damages for breach of" racially restrictive covenants. Its application to instances of the use of state courts
and state trespass or breach of the peace laws to vindicate discrimination in service in places of public accommodation has thus far been
avoided in the "sit in" cases by resort to due process prohibitions
against convictions devoid of evidentiary support or convictions for
crimes not charged,17 or by finding that the decision to discriminate
was made by the state rather than, or as well as by, the owner of the
public accomodation." But this application of the fourteenth amendment is being urged again in "sit in" cases argued before the Supreme
Court this term.
54 Id., at 506, 508.
55 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
516
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
57 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
58 Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963) ; Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267
(1963) ; Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
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Of more interest here is the first idea expressed in Marsh v.
Alabama, that property devoted to a public use may be regulated to
protect fourteenth amendment rights. When combined with the notion
that state inaction may also violate consitutional guarantees, it opens
broad new vistas. For in the Pollak case the Court was clear that the
application of the first and fifth amendments did not depend upon the
franchise granted to the transit company by Congress:
[W]e do not rely on the mere fact that Capital Transit operates a
public utility on the streets of the District of Columbia under authority
of Congress. Nor do we rely upon the fact that, by reason of such
federal authorization, Capital Transit now enjoys a substantial monopoly ...in the District of Columbia. We do, however, recognize

that Capital Transit operates its service under the regulatory supervision of the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia
which is an agency authorized by Congress. We rely particularly upon
the fact that that agency, pursuant to protests against the radio program, ordered an investigation of it and, after formal public hearings,
ordered its investigation dismissed on the ground that the public
safety, comfort and convenience were not impaired thereby. 59
In other words, constitutional guarantees against governmental
action became applicable solely because of government's failure to act
on a matter within its authority. In the Pollak case the Commission's
authority to act may have been particularly clear because the transit
company was a "public utility." But the District of Columbia's regulatory powers are not confiined to public utilities. It also has the
power to forbid racial discrimination in the services of a privatelyowned restaurant in the District. And, as Mr. Justice Douglas
explained for the Court, it has the power because Congress could and
did confer upon the District "all the powers of legislation which may
be exercised by a state in dealing with its affairs." The District has
authority "as broad as the police power of a state so as to include a
law prohibiting discriminations against Negroes by the owners and
managers of restaurants."6
If the failure of the District of Columbia to exercise its police power
over a public utility may constitute government action within the
meaning of constitutional guarantees, why is not the failure of the
59Supra note 48 at 462.
60 District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., Inc., 346 U.S. 100, 108, 110
(1953). In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra note 51, the Court also
noted that the Authority by its lease could have forbidden the lessee to discriminate
and concluded that, "By its inaction, the Authority. .. has not only made itself a party
to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power, property and prestige
behind the admitted discrimination." 365 U.S. at 725.
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District-or of a state-to exercise its police power over restaurants
or other subjects of police power regulation also state action?
Terry v. Adams,6 the latest of the Texas primary cases, strongly
suggests that it is. The primary election conducted by the Jaybird
Party in advance of the primary provided for by state law, but the
"only election that has counted in this Texas county for more than
fifty years," was held to constitute state action in violation of the
fifteenth amendment because the Jaybird Party excluded Negroes
from membership. It made no difference that "the state does not
control that part of this elective process which it leaves for the Jaybirds to manage." "It violates the Fifteenth Amendment," as three
Justices put it, "for a state, by such circumvention, to permit... the
use of any device that produces an equivalent of the prohibited election." Or, as four other Justices expressed it, "when a state structures
its electoral apparatus in a form which devolves upon a political
organization the uncontested choice of public officials, that organization itself, in whatever disguise, takes on those attributes of government which draw the Constitution's safeguards into play." In other
words, the state violates the fifteenth amendment by doing nothing at
all-by failing to act in a situation where it had power to act and
where the result of its inaction is to permit racial discrimination which
it could not authorize. As Professor Williams has pointed out,62 the
same concept of state inaction as a violation of the fourteenth amend3 holding that state failure to reapment is implicit in Baker v. Carr,"
portion legislative districts to take account of population shifts may
amount to a denial of equal protection.
Indeed, it seems inevitable that state inaction must be weighed in
the balance under constitutional provisions which forbid the state to
"deprive" any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, or to "deny" any person the equal protection of the laws. In a
variety of circumstances the deprivation or the denial of protection
may come precisely because the state fails to act. In such circumstances, as Walter Gellhorn has said, "when the state does not intervene..., it is making a choice just as surely as when it does
intervene.""
01345 U.S. 461, 469, 484 (1953).
62 Williams,

he Twilight of State Action, 41 TEX. 347, 364 (1963).

63369 U.S. 186 (1962).
64 GELLHoRN, AMEC,
RMGHTs, 172 (1960). Cf. Horowitz, The Misleading
Search for "State Action" under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 So. CAL. L. Rxv. 208,
216-19 (1957).
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If the state may violate the fourteenth amendment by its failure to
prohibit-or, as it was in Terry v. Adams, by permitting-private discriminatory action which it has authority to forbid, the thrust of the
argument in two of Mr. Justice Douglas' recent concurring opinions in
the "sit in"cases involving privately owned restaurants becomes more
apparent. In Garner v. Louisiana,65 after noting that the majority
opinion in the Civil Rights Cases referred to "state authority in the
66
he
shape of laws, customs or judicial or executive proceedings,"
traced the evolution of state power to regulate business activity, from
the "public utility" cases, through the expanding list of businesses
"affected with a public interest" to Nebbia v. New York, 67 which was
taken to establish that, "A business may have a 'public interest' even
though it is not a 'public utility' in the accepted sense, even though it
enjoys no franchise from the State, and even though it enjoys no
monopoly." From this he concluded:
Those who own retail establishments under permit from a municipality operate a public facility in which there can be no more discrimination based on race than is constitutionally permissible in the
more customary types of public facility.
[T]here can be no difference.., between one kind of business that
is regulated in the public interest and another kind so far as the
problem of racial segregation is concerned.... The authority to
license a business for public use is derived from the public. Negroes
are as much a part of the public as are whites. A municipality granting a license to operate a business for the public represents Negroes
as well as other races who live there. A license to establish a restaurant is a license to establish a public facility and necessarily imports,
Il
in law, equality of use for all members of the public ....
69 he invoked the dissenting views of the
In Lombard v. Louisiana,
first Mr. Justice Harlan in the Civil Rights Cases:

In every material sense applicable to the practical enforcement of
the Fourteenth Amendment, railroad corporations, keepers of inns,
and managers of places of public amusement are agents or instrumentalities of the state, because they are charged with duties to the public
and are amenable, in respect of their duties and functions, to governmental regulation.... [A] denial, by these instrumentalities of the
state, to the citizen, because of his race, of that equality of civil rights
secured to him by law, is a denial by the state, within the meaning
65 Supra note 57.

66109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
67291 U.S. 502 (1934).
68 368 U.S. 182-183, 184.
69 Supra

note 58.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment. If it be not, then that race is left,
in respect of the civil rights in question, practically at the mercy of
corporations and individuals wielding power under the states." 70
That conclusion seemed to Mr. Justice Douglas to follow also from
what had been decided later:
The nexus between the state and the private enterprise may be
control, as in the case of a state agency, or the nexus may be one of
numerous other devices.... A state-assisted enterprise serving the
public does not escape its constitutional duty to serve all customers
irrespective of race, even though its actual operation is in the hands of
a lessee. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.... State licensing
and surveillance of a business serving the public also brings its service
into the public domain. This restaurant needs a permit from Louisiana
to operate; and during the existence of the license the State has broad
powers of visitation and control. This restaurant is thus an instrumentality of the state since the State charges it with duties to the
public and supervises its performance. The State's interest in and activity with regard to its restaurants extends far beyond any mere
income-producing licensing requirement.7 1

Recent criticism of this position seems to miss the mark in equating the public "license" to which Mr. Justice Douglas refers to the
"permit?' which the state or city had actually issued and in ignoring
the precedent for treating state inaction as violating the fourteenth
amendment."2 It may be true that state assistance to enterprise, as
in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, may provide some basis
for state regulation of racial practices, and that a state-conferred
monopoly may provide a similar basis for similar regulation of public
utilities.7
But it is equally true that the state's power to regulate
the racial practices of such public accommodations as restaurants is
as firmly established without special public assistance or monopoly
franchise. 7 ' The only significance of a formally issued "permit" conditioned on payment of taxes or compliance with health or safety
requirements is to indicate that the business is one subject to taxation
or regulation in other ways also in the public interest. But the fourteenth amendment question should not be affected by the fact that the
state issues neither permits nor licenses for the business-a point
70 109 U.S. 3 at 58-59 (1883).
71373 U.S. at 282-283.
72. Karst & Van Alstyne, Sit-Ins and State Actian--Mr. Justice Douglas Concurring, 14 STAN. L. REv. 762, 774-75 (1962).
73Id. at 774-75.

74Supra note 60.
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of more than rhetorical moment in view of the 1959 action of Prince
Edward County, Virginia, in closing its public schools, and of the
Tennessee statute abrogating the innkeeper's common law duty to
serve all.75
The state's power to prohibit racial discrimination with respect to
any particular enterprise being established, the only remaining constitutional question is whether its failure to exercise that power should
be viewed as violating the fourteenth amendment. If Public Utilities
Comm'n v. Pollak" and Terry v. Adams" be construed, as they might
be, to require knowing acquiescence in private discrimination rather
than mere inaction by the state, then the existence of an established
discriminatory custom would be relevant to the application of the
fourteenth amendment.
At the present moment no one can with confidence undertake to
define the outer limits of the "state action" (or state inaction) concept.
But, so far as questions of racial discrimination in violation of the
fourteenth amendment are concerned, the following propositions seem
to me defensible:
(1) The states can anticipate little success with subterfuges designed
to cloak discriminatory state action as private action. As the fifteenth
amendment "nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes
of discrimination,"" 8 so does the fourteenth nullify sophisticated as
well as simple-minded camouflages of state action."
(2) Quite apart from questions of collusion or subterfuge, those
who are vested by the state with authority to regulate the affairs
of others will be forbidden to exercise their authority, and perhaps
to exercise other powers over their constituents, in a discriminatory
fashion.
(3) Those who operate enterprises on state-owned property will
be forbidden to discriminate, and the same rule will probably be
applied to those who receive other forms of economic assistance from
the state.
(4) There is good reason to expect that any enterprise subject to
75 See Turner v.
76 Supra note 48.

"" Supra note 61.

City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962).

Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
"State support of segregated schools through any arrangement, management
funds, or property cannot be squared with the [Fourteenth] Amendment's command
that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958).
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the state's power to forbid discrimination will be required to operate
in a non-discriminatory manner.
Except for labor union cases, none of the decisions upon which these
conclusions are based dealt with the employment relation in any way.
But I believe that all of the conclusions are applicable to discriminatory employment practices because, since the decision in Brown
v. Board of Educ.,8" the Supreme Court has treated all forms of racial
discrimination as fungible under the fourteenth amendment. That
decision has been treated as justifying summary disapproval of racial
segregation or exclusion in state recreation facilities,81 that decision
and the decisions on recreational facilities have been treated as
conclusive on the unconstitutionality of segregation in transportation,"2
and the transportation decisions are added to the list of authorities justifying summary invalidation of segregation in restaurants."
Finally, as I have previously indicated,84 the education and transportation decisions are taken to establish that "any state or federal
law requiring applicants for any job to be turned away because
of their color" would be invalid under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments.
It seems to me dear, therefore, that the reach of constitutional
guarantee against racial discrimination is as great in the area of
employment as in any other. But it seems equally clear that judicial
enforcement of these guarantees through injunction and possibly by
way of defenses to litigation designed to implement discriminatory
practices, is a particularly poor way to enforce the right to equal
treatment in employment.85 What is needed is a federal statute
creating an administrative agency with enforcement powers similar
to those of the NLRB, with power to act on its own initiative, and
with power to grant interim relief. I turn, therefore, to a brief inquiry
into the possible reach of such a federal statute.
PowER OF CONGRESS
Congress clearly has the power to legislate against discrimination
T:

8

oSitpra note 24.

81New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958);

Holmes v. City, 350 U.S. 879 (1958); Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
See also Watson v. City, 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
82 Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) ; Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962).
83
Turner v. City, supra note 75.
84 See text at notes 24-26, supra.
85 For some of the difficulties in framing injuctive relief to vindicate voting rights
under the Civil Rights Act of 1957, see United States v. Beaty, 288 F.2d 653 (6th

Cir. 1961).
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in employment by any means which can be characterized as "state
action." And if I am right in my conclusion that state inaction against
private discrimination may constitute a violation of the fourteenth
amendment, then Congress may legislate against state inaction also
under the power conferred upon it by section 5 of that amendment
"to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
In other words, the notion that state inaction may violate the fourteenth Amendment has undermined the view expressed in the Civil
Rights Cases that Congress may not "provide due process of law"
nor "establish laws for.., equal protection."8 6 In any event, a strong
argument can be made that, at least with respect to the equal protection clause, that view was contrary to the "original understanding"
of the fourteenth amendment."
This is not to say, of course, that Congress could or should undertake to define the situations to which the federal statute should apply.
Rather, it should employ the technique used with respect to voting
rights in the Civil Rights Act of 1957,88 by legislating generally
against discriminatory employment practices by anyone. The question
of the constitutionality of any particular application can then be left
to be determined in the course of the law's administration as United
States v. Raines89 has authorized for the 1957 Act. But the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment,
as well as the due process clause of the fifth amendment, should be
specifically denominated as some of the sources of constitutional
power which Congress has invoked.
It also seems apparent, as the Administration has urged in connection with its proposed public accommodations bill," that Congress
should in addition invoke the commerce power. Certainly a power
that is adequate to support legislation against such diverse subjects
as lottery tickets,9' impure and misbranded food and drugs, 2 pros88 109 U.S. at 13.
87 See Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the
Laws," 50 COLUm. L. REV. 131 (1950).
88 42 U.S.C. §1971.
89 363 U.S. 17 (196). See also United States v. McElveen, 177 F. Supp. 355 (E.D.

La., 1959), aff'd 362 U.S. 58 (1960).
90 See statement of the Department of Justice, Civil Rights-Public Accommodations
Hearings before Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 1732, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1295-1299 (1963).
9' Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
92 United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948) ; McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228
U.S. 115 (1913).
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titutes,93 stolen automobiles, "' child labor,95 price discrimination,"
and unfair methods of competition, 91 and which may be exercised
to fix maximum hours and minimum wages"' and to forbid discrimination in employment on grounds of union membership or activity,99
may be exercised also to forbid discrimination in employment on
grounds of race.
Obviously the commerce power will reach many situations which
the Congressional power under the fourteenth amendment will not
reach. But, though the commerce power is wondrously broad, particularly since Wickard v. Filburn,10° it may fail to reach some areas
which the fourteenth amendment will cover. Under certain circumstances, for instance, the fourteenth amendment might apply to Mrs.
Murphy's boarding house, about which certain Senators were concerned during the hearings on the public accommodations bill.
And it seems to me that a federal prohibition against racial discrimination in employment should reach Mrs. Murphy's boarding
house. It has been suggested that the application of a law forbidding
discrimination in employment must be "balanced" against a freedom
to discriminate which is also protected by the due process clause, and
that the latter freedom may be found to weigh heaviest when personal
association between employer and employee is close.101 But when a
labor union made a similar due process argument against a state
statute forbidding racial discrimination in its membership it was told,
0 2 that to conclude "that such legisin Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi,"
lation violated the fourteenth amendment would be a distortion of the
policy manifested in that amendment which was adopted to prevent
state legislation designed to perpetuate discrimination on the basis of
race or color." And the most assiduous balancer of them ali added that
such a claim was "devoid of constitutional substance" since to "use the
Fourteenth Amendment as a sword against state power would stultify
Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
O5United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
96 15 U.S.C. §13.
97 F.T.C.v.R. F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
98
Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942).
0o Supra note 21.
93

94

100317 U.S. 111 (1942).

101 Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3, 36-44 (1961).
WiLmi."is, op. cit. supra note 62 at 369-73.
102 326 U.S. 88, 93-94 (1945).
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that Amendment."'0 3 True, Mrs. Murphy is not a labor union, but it
would be a rather remarkable turnabout of history to find in the due
process clause protection for a private interest in excluding Negroes
from employment as domestics.
Even though Congress invokes its full legislative powers under
the due process, equal protection and commerce clauses, there will
be ragged edges on the coverage of the statute and areas which are
not covered. And administration of the statute would be hindered
with litigation about coverage. These difficulties would be eliminated
if a Court which has already adopted the dissenting views of the first
Mr. Justice Harlan on the invalidity of the "separate but equal"
notion under the fourteenth amendment.. were also to accept his
dissenting views in the Civil Rights Cases on the meaning of the
thirteenth. The latter amendment, outlawing "slavery" and "involuntary servitude" and carrying its own authorization to Congress "to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation," is not limited, as are
the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, to state action. It runs, and the legislative authority conferred
by it on Congress runs also, to completely private action. As was
said in applying the anti-peonage provisions of the federal criminal
code to private parties, the thirteenth amendment "denounces a status
or condition, irrespective of the manner or authority by which it is
created."'0 5 The only problem lies in the definition of the "status
or condition." The first Mr. Justice Harlan would have defined it
broadly:
That there are burdens and disabilities which constitute badges of
slavery and servitude, and that the power to enforce by appropriate
legislation the Thirteenth Amendment may be exerted by legislation
of a direct and primary character, for the eradication, not simply of
the institution, but of its badges and incidents, are propositions which
ought to be deemed indisputable.... [U] nder the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress has to do with slavery and its incidents; and...
legislation, so far as necessary or proper to eradicate all forms and
incidents of slavery and involuntary servitude, may be direct and
primary, operating upon acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by
state legislation or not.... I do not contend that the Thirteenth
Amendment invests Congress with authority, by legislation, to define
and regulate the entire body of the civil rights which citizens enjoy,
or may enjoy, in the several States. But I hold that since slavery...
103 Id., Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring at 98.

1o4 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
105 Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216 (1905).
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was the moving or principal cause of the adoption of that amendment,
and since that institution rested wholly upon the inferiority, as a race,

of those held in bondage, their freedom necessarily involved immunity
from, and protection against, all discrimination against them, because
of their race, in respect of such civil rights as belong to free men of
other races. Congress, therefore.... may enact laws to protect that
people against the deprivation, because of their race, of any civil rights
granted to other free men, in the same State ....
106
When the Court later concluded that the thirteenth amendment did
not authorize a federal statute which would penalize private action
designed to compel Negroes to abandon their employment, Mr.
Justice Harlan was joined by Mr. Justice Day in protesting that
the statute did no more than to prohibit action "to subject anyone
07
to the badges or incidents of slavery."
I am pleased to note that Mr. Justice Harlan's views now command
the adherence of Dean Erwin Griswold, who has been urging them
before Congressional Committees, 08 and that the Department of Justice has also taken cognizance of them.0 9 It seems to me that a federal
statute forbidding racial discrimination in employment should also
invoke the legislative powers conferred by the thirteenth amendment
so that the way will be open to ask the Supreme Court to reconsider
the question.
Another avenue to the coverage of much of the discrimination not
within the reach of the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment or of the commerce clause may be found
in another provision in the fourteenth amendment. Not all of the
provisions of that amendment are cast as restraints on state action.
In particular, the first sentence of section 1 provides that, "All persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside." This provision, like the thirteenth amendment, deals with a
status or condition. And the legislative authority conferred on Congress by section 5 of the amendment to "enforce... the provisions
of this article" reaches as well to this provision as to any other. Why
should not a federal statute forbidding racial discrimination in em100 109 U.S. at 35-6.
107 Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 35 (1906).
108 Literacy Tests and Voter Requirements in Federal... State Elections-Hearings
before Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of Senate Committee on Judiciary on
S.480, S.2750 and S.2929. 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 134-35, 138 (1962) ; Civil RightsPublic Accommodations Hearings before Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 1732,
88th Cong., Ist Sess., 776, 787 (1963).
100 Ibid., 1302-1303.
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ployment define the right to be free from such discrimination, public
or private, as a right of national citizenship? And if it did, would
it not be difficult for the Supreme Court to declare either that Congress
had no right to define the ingredients of national citizenship or that
it had erred in including this fundamental civil right in the definition?
There is, of course, a logical answer to this argument. The provision
I have quoted is immediately followed by the provision that, "No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States." Ergo, it can hardly
have been intended to guarantee rights of United States citizenship
against state or private action in the first sentence of the amendment,
since that would render the strictures against state abridgment in
the second sentence mere surplusage. The conclusion must be that
the first sentence, while it confers citizenship, does not authorize
Congress or the Court to define the rights of citizenship.
This is a good logical argument. It is as logical as the argument
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment cannot
incorporate any of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights because the Bill of Rights also contains a due process clause. It may
meet with no more success than that argument did. It seems to me,
therefore, that any federal statute should define the right to be free
from racial discrimination in employment as an ingredient of the
national citizenship conferred by the fourteenth amendment. 110
I have previously suggested that the federal statute should also
invoke the fifth amendment as a source of constitutional authority.
Such invocation would be entirely appropriate if for no other reason
than that the statutory command would be in part addressed to those
whose action would be characterized as federal action subject to the
due process clause of that amendment. But I must confess, finally,
that it appeals to me for an entirely separate reason as I contemplate
the limitations which have been found in the fact that the fourteenth
amendment provides that "no state" shall deny due process or equal
protection.
As Alexander Pekelis has pointed out,"' the fifth amendment reads
in pertinent part "nor shall any person.., be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." It is not by its terms
limited to a restraint on governmental action. It may be clear enough
110 The idea has already occurred to Senator Prouty. Hearings before Senate
Committee on Commerce on S. 1732, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 791 (1963).
I"1 PEKELIs,
LAW AND SocIAL ACTION, 108-113 (1950).
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as an historical matter that the fifth amendment was not intended
as a limitation on the states. It is probably equally clear that the
"original understanding" took no account of, because it could not
anticipate, the latter-day development of "the capacity of private
power-aggregates to limit the very freedoms the Constitution has
attempted to protect.""' 2 That being true, the "original understanding" need not be given conclusive effect and the due process clause of
the fifth amendment could be applied to private action. It is still a
Constitution we are expounding, and it was ordained and established
to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."

ADDENDUM
With respect to the text accompanying footnote 3, supra, the Department of Labor has recently promulgated regulations designed to
eliminate racial discrimination in training programs administered by
it.28 Fed.Reg. 13775 (1963).

112 GELLHORN, op. cit s11pra note 64 at 163.

